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Education
Abstract
Unlike traditional embedded systems such as secure smart cards, emerging secure deeplyembedded systems, e.g., implantable and wearable medical devices, have larger “attack surface”.
A security breach in such systems which are embedded deeply in human bodies or objects would
be life-threatening, for which adopting traditional solutions might not be practical due to tight
constraints of these often-battery-powered systems. Unfortunately, although emerging
cryptographic engineering research mechanisms have started solving this critical problem,
university education (at both graduate and undergraduate level) lags comparably. One of the
pivotal reasons for such a lag is the multi-disciplinary nature of the emerging security
bottlenecks (mathematics, engineering, science, and medicine, to name a few). Based on the
aforementioned motivation, in this paper, we present an effective research and education
integration strategy to overcome this issue at Rochester Institute of Technology. Moreover, we
present the results of more than one year implementation of the presented strategy at graduatelevel through “side-channel analysis attacks” case studies. The results of the presented work
show the success of the presented methodology while pinpointing the challenges encountered
compared to traditional embedded system security research/teaching integration.

Introduction
Embedded system security is one of the main concerns of any nation with direct organizational,
societal, and economical effects. The growing number of instances of security breaches in the
last few years has created a compelling case for efforts towards securing such systems1, and
refining new research and teaching trends2, 3. It is known that the number of embedded devices in
use, currently, is about two orders of magnitude higher than that of desktops and it is envisioned
that deeply-embedded systems follow such trend as well.
Unlike traditional embedded systems, deeply-embedded systems which are deployed in human
bodies and objects have two distinct characteristics, differentiating them from the traditional
ones. First, such systems are embedded into very sensitive environments, e.g., cardiovascular
defibrillators embedded into human bodies which perform therapeutic tasks or insulin
pump/glucose monitoring pairs which are used for diagnosis and therapy4, 5. A security breach
here is life-threatening and unlike traditional embedded systems such as smart cards in which
financial loss is the result of the breach, here, catastrophic and vitally-adverse problems are
inevitable.
The other pivotal concern in deploying traditional cryptographic architectures into deeplyembedded systems [both hardware through application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) and
field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), and software through microcontrollers] is the
potential, unacceptable degradation of performance and implementation metrics5. For instance, if
the security protection schemes for a pacemaker (typically battery-powered to perform medical
tasks for roughly 10 years) lead to its battery depletion in 6 months, the resulting (now secure)
device would be unacceptable, life-threatening, and impractical to use.

In this paper, we present integrating emerging cryptographic engineering (used for protecting the
aforementioned deeply-embedded systems) research with security education. This project is
addressing the respective tradeoffs between the security levels (noting the larger attack surface
for deeply-embedded systems) and affording the overheads applicably, which are the two main
facets of the proposed integration. To meet this objective, we have used such methodology for
more than a year in educating graduate students at Rochester Institute of Technology and brought
them very well up to speed which resulted in successful research (publications in top-tier
electrical and computer engineering IEEE Transactions journals for the case study of sidechannel analysis attacks and reliability).
We have had the following goals in such integration:
(a) Exposing the challenges of deeply-embedded system security education;
(b) Hardware and software secure system co-design teaching and research integration (in
previous work, theory and practice are combined for such purpose: A co-design course
applying symmetric key ciphers has been presented6, a helicopter-like robot motion
control has been implemented7, and co-design as an emerging discipline in education has
been discussed8);
(c) Developing a respective multi-disciplinary laboratory for both research and teaching of
hardware/software security; and
(d) Advancing education through inter- and intra-university research collaborations (it is
noted that the authors of this work are from different and diverse backgrounds).
We note that a cryptographic system was chosen for deeply-embedded security integration of
research and teaching for a number of reasons: (a) efficient and practical use of cryptography
will be one of the major schemes in providing security in future deeply-embedded systems and
(b) the cryptographic architectures are modular thus dividing the tasks in performing research or
instructing in multiple independent sessions is possible.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we present select topics and sub-topics
essentially needed for cryptographic engineering research and teaching integration. Next, the
integration methodology is explained through a case study. This includes the challenges for the
experimented studies. The paper is concluded by summarizing the project’s results.

Research/Teaching Topic Essentials
Although there are few resources very specific to embedded systems security education (not
typically designed for undergraduate or college/university level education9, 10), deeply-embedded
systems security challenges and mechanisms have not been subject of specific readings/books for
teaching and educational purposes, to the best of authors’ knowledge. As such, in order to
provide select topics and sub-topics essentially needed for cryptographic engineering
research/teaching integration, we need to differentiate the materials used in embedded security
courses11, 12 and the ones specific to deeply-embedded security for the purpose of integration in
this paper. Table 1 presents select topics we have considered in the integration process. We note
that the topics presented can be extended to a larger, more comprehensive list. Nonetheless,
because the presented work is scalable, such extension is acceptable and possible (based on the
security requirements, the overheads that can be tolerated, and the usage models).

Table 1. Select topics essentially needed for cryptographic engineering
research/teaching integration
Select topics

Cryptographic
implementations

•
•
•
•
•
•

Implementation
attacks

Tools and
methodologies

Applications

•

Select sub-topics
Hardware architectures for deeply-embedded systems
Cryptographic embedded processors and co-processors
Hardware accelerators
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs)
Efficient embedded software implementations
Side-channel attacks and countermeasures targeting
deeply-embedded systems
Fault attacks and countermeasures (considering
practical attacks for deeply-embedded hardware)

•
•
•
•
•
•

Computer aided cryptographic engineering
Metrics for the security of embedded systems
Secure programming techniques
FPGA design security (embedded hardware)
Topics related to post-quantum cryptography
Topics related to machine learning security

•
•

Cryptography for deeply-embedded systems
Reconfigurable hardware for cryptography (embedded
hardware)
Technologies and hardware for content protection
Trusted computing platforms deeply-embedded into
human body or objects

•
•

As the main objective of this paper is integration of research and teaching, we refrain from
presenting the topics used for education purposes only and are not the results of our prior
research work. However, it is useful to note that a specific course in deeply-embedded systems
security (and as such, a potential textbook) may have four main readings/chapters, i.e., the select
topics in Table 1 in addition to, typically, an Introduction and a Discussion. Moreover, we note
that such course/reading needs to take into account the level of readers (undergraduate- or
graduate-level, for instance) and, accordingly, needs to be tailored noting different considerations
including real-world examples (to encourage the students and give them the context), references
to the state-of-the-art (for undergraduate students, specifically, to encourage graduate-level
studies), platforms for hardware and software (free-of-charge platform tools for
simulations/syntheses/implementations, for instance), to name a few.

Integration of Side-Channel Analysis Research/Teaching
To present the results of our teaching and research integration, we have used “side-channel
analysis attacks” as our topic at Rochester Institute of Technology. Any attack based on
information gained from the physical implementation of a cryptosystem (on hardware or

software), rather than brute force or theoretical weaknesses in the algorithms is denoted as sidechannel analysis. For example, timing information or power consumption can provide an extra
source of information which can be exploited to break the system. There are two main reasons
for such a choice: (a) this topic is related to many other topics in Table 1 and, thus, allows us to
cover a large number of topics/sub-topics used for cryptographic engineering research/teaching
integration. These related topics and sub-topics include “hardware architectures for deeplyembedded systems”, “side-channel attacks and countermeasures targeting deeply-embedded
systems”, “fault attacks and countermeasures (considering practical attacks for deeply-embedded
hardware)”, “FPGA design security (embedded hardware)”, “cryptography for deeply-embedded
systems”, “reconfigurable hardware for cryptography (embedded hardware)”, “technologies and
hardware for content protection”, and “trusted computing platforms deeply-embedded into
human body or objects”, and (b) the authors have extensive experience with the topic, making it
suitable to analyze and elaborate.
Phase 1. Identifying the Challenges of Education for Initiating Research: A group of five
students who perform research under the supervision of the authors of this work was chosen (we
note that although the focus has been on the aforementioned topic, some students were directed
to work on general “reliability” approaches to broaden the focus beyond cryptography). Active
side-channel attacks topic through fault injection has been selected as it combines simulations
and implementations for which the students acquired knowledge through choosing three
textbooks and instruction of the authors: “Error Control Coding”13, “Fault-Tolerant Systems”14,
and “Cryptography Engineering”15. The objective of this phase was to familiarize the students
through education-based instruction with the topic of the research. The outcome was satisfactory
although the third textbook, i.e., “Cryptography Engineering”, was mainly used as reference.
One of the main goals of this phase was to expose the challenges of deeply-embedded systems
security education. The aforementioned textbooks were fit resources for the research; yet, they
were not sufficient for the topics covered in this project. Thus, the first challenge was to find
resources directly related to deeply-embedded systems security education. As this is an emerging
topic and includes studying emerging cryptographic engineering, in addition to these three
books, students were directed to read select articles from three conferences in the field:
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES)16, Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in
Cryptography (FDTC)17, and Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)18. The second
challenge was the multi-disciplinary nature of the topic chosen (electrical engineering, computer
engineering, mathematics, computer science, and the like). Although this challenge necessities
having students with diverse backgrounds, the expertise of authors in these topics helped filling
the gap in cases where students were not acquainted with the field of study. Moreover, knowing
such gap, the instructors (authors of this work) consulted with faculty members from other
departments (especially computer science and mathematics) to meet the teaching objectives.
Phase 2. Research and Development: Differential fault analysis is a variant of side-channel
analysis attacks in the field of cryptography (active sub-variant). The principle in such attacks is
to induce faults maliciously (intentionally injecting faults into the architectures of cryptosystems) to reveal their internal states.
With respect to deeply-embedded systems, for instance, a pacemaker containing an embedded
processor might be subjected to a number of conditions, e.g., high temperature, unsupported
supply voltage or current, excessively high overclocking, strong electric or magnetic fields, or

Theory of fault
diagnosis and
tolerance in
cryptography

Error simulations

Implementations on
hardware platforms

- Hardware redundancy
(Parity, duplication, etc.)

- Single and multiple stuck-at
zero or one

- Derivation of area/power
consumption overheads

- Time redundancy
(Naïve method, recomputing
using encoded operands)

- Through C-based simulations
or linear-feedback shift
registers on ASIC/FPGA

- Derivation of frequency/
throughput/efficiency
overheads

Figure 1. Sub-parts of the presented research scheme for integrating with teaching in this work.
ionizing radiation, to influence the operation of the processor (here the processor is an ASIC
architecture typically; yet, FPGAs containing the designs of cryptographic algorithms can very
similarly be attacked). After such fault attack, the processor on the pacemaker may begin to
output incorrect results due to physical data corruption. Such erroneous output may help a
cryptanalyst deduce the instructions that the processor is running.
Many countermeasures (typically based on error detection schemes) have been proposed to
defend from this attack. Therefore, using the previous experience of the authors, a group of
students were instructed the background topics13-18, and the teaching tasks were followed as seen
in the flowchart of Fig. 1, including three sub-parts: (a) theory of fault diagnosis and tolerance in
cryptography, (b) simulation steps for error coverage derivation for single/multiple stuck-at
zero/one faults, and (c) implementation on hardware platforms, i.e., ASIC (Synopsys tools) and
FPGA (Xilinx tools), to derive the overheads induced.
Finally, we have given three sub-cases to the students: (a) low-complexity block ciphers which
are more lightweight than the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), (b) public-key
cryptography with the case elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC), and (c) non-cryptography
computer arithmetic architectures (e.g., complex division) whose reliability assurance is critical.
These sub-cases have been selected carefully to cover a wide-range of applications. It is worth
mentioning that the authors of this work have extensive background on fault detection and
tolerance in many fields including cryptography19-34.
Phase 3. Integration of Research and Teaching: The last phase included integrating the
research on emerging cryptographic engineering with teaching. For this objective, we have built
on the research of a group of graduate students in the second phase during the academic year of
2013-2014 and used the lessons learnt in the integration process.
The first note here is engaging students in non-traditional learning activities for understanding
the deeply-embedded system security topics shown in Table 1. This included (a) asking them to
read research papers and explain the core of research on deeply-embedded system security, (b)
contacting the authors of research papers through email to broaden the understating, and (c)
having discussion sessions among themselves and share the learning materials including but not
limited to simulation and implementation environment, typesetting details, and the like.

Integration of teaching and research
differences of traditional and deeplyembedded systems
Security differences
- Increasingly integrated into insecure physical
environments leading to greater exposure to
attackers.
- The applications have unique usage models and, as a
result, traditional security solutions may not be applicable
or may not suffice.
- The systems have transient usage patterns, where access
privileges need to be defined over time and space, not
just by the user.

Implementation
differences
- The number of embedded systems per human user will
drastically increase – making it impractical for users to
explicitly perform system administration tasks such as
security patching, etc.
- Many of these systems will need to be transparently
integrated into the environment and operate using energy
scavenged from environmental sources – the consequent
size and energy constraints imposed on any security
solutions are extreme.

Figure 2. Traditional vs. deeply-embedded security teaching and research integration.
The second step was to contrast traditional embedded security and deeply-embedded security
based on the differences between these two. Fig. 2 shows the major differences taught to the
students which were partly results of prior research work in 2013-2014 academic year at
Rochester Institute of Technology; thus, a step-forward towards integration of emerging
cryptographic engineering teaching and research.
The third step is to identify the modularity of different cryptographic algorithms such as AES
and ECC to apply fault diagnosis and tolerance techniques specified for deeply-embedded
systems. Fig. 3 shows such modularity for ECC which was instructed to the students and noted
that in order to have applicable fault diagnosis methods for ECC for deeply-embedded systems
(for instance, processors of pacemakers), we need to have low overhead and high error coverage.
In Fig. 3, the hierarchy of computation of ECC is depicted which is known as ECC Pyramid (this
was explained in detailed to the students, which is not elaborated here for the sake of brevity). As
one can see, on the top of the pyramid, security establishment protocols such as elliptic curve
Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), digital signature algorithm (ECDSA), and integrated encryption
scheme (ECIES) are placed. In all of these security protocols which are standardized by several
national and international organizations, the main computation is point multiplication. The
elliptic curve point multiplication is defined as Q = k.P, where k is a positive integer, and Q and
P are two points on the elliptic curve. The efficiency of computing point multiplication depends
on finding the minimum number of steps to reach Q from a given point P.
Some of the educational goals in this step were (a) understanding the implementation platforms
(commonly referred to as hardware [ASIC/FPGA] or software platforms [microcontrollers])
through which the overheads were derived, (b) soft skills including presentation of the results of
deeply-embedded security research orally or in writing, team-work, decision-making, and the
like, and (c) hard technical skills for simulations and implementations of the fault diagnosis
schemes for crypto-systems including those based on AES and ECC.

ECDH, ECDSA,
ECIES

One

Q= k.P

Point
Multiplication

Hundreds of curve Ops.
Point
addition

Addition over
finite field

Multiplication
over finite field

Point
doubling

Squaring
over finite field

Inversion
over finite field

Thousands of field Ops.

Clock
cycles

Figure 3. Hierarchy of the ECC operations used in differentiating traditional and embedded
system security for integrating research/teaching.
The security assessment is based on the resources in the already-developed “Applied
Cryptography” laboratory; the research is conducted by the graduate students. The experiments
will be part of two relevant graduate/undergraduate courses taught by the authors. The form of
outcome of the assessment will be mostly in programming languages specially hardware
description languages of cryptographic algorithms developed in the courses as final projects.

Teaching and Research Integration Complications
In what follows, we present through three instances, the complications we had in the integration
process for three steps of theory, simulation, and implementation.
Theory: The theory of fault detection and tolerance with respect to cryptography is broad and
includes different methods with redundancy of hardware and time. Such methods were instructed
to the students through the aforementioned books. Nevertheless, a major complication here was
that the reliability approaches taught might not be suitable for fault attack immunity.
Specifically, the attackers might use entropy-aware injections to bypass the solutions. Through
the research work done in 2013-2014 academic year, we had identified very carefully different
reliability approaches; yet, we refined them to have specific applicability to fault attacks in the
second round and during the integration phase.
Simulation: Single stuck-at fault injection in ASIC and FPGA platforms are usually done for
assessing the effectiveness of the proposed fault diagnose methods. Nevertheless, the injection
locations depend on the specific problem to solve, e.g., AES or ECC architectures. Thus, a
challenge here is that the integration of research and teaching becomes very application-specific
and dynamic with respect to simulations. A second challenge here is the choice of hardware or
software based injections through C++ or LFSRs. This is again very dependent on the nature of
research, for instance, a simple reason to choose one method over another would be the
availability of source codes in hardware or software. These two and several other environment
and application specific choices make the integration of “simulation” step as a number of general
guidelines rather than specific schemes.

Implementation: Finally, the complications in the implementation step usually relate to the
resources available (ASIC and FPGA tools and hardware, for instance). Therefore, for such a
choice, general guidelines are preferred. We note that such a choice affects the implementation
and performance metrics as well; thus, the integration need to be tailored based on the usage
models.

Discussions and Lessons Learnt
High level research is seen as driver of economic growth. Increasing the number of students
pursuing research towards graduate studies is also important for economic and social growth. As
such, one of the main objectives of this paper is to focus on an extremely-sensitive research area
and perform pedagogical developments and drive to improve student experience of research-led
teaching and integration of research/teaching.
After integrating the research performed in 2013-2014 by authors (and select previous research
work), the integration of the results into teaching led to a number of useful lessons. We observed
increased student engagement and deeper understanding through inquiry-led learning of
fundamentals of deeply-embedded systems security (measured through project-based
assessments). Such integration provided students with additional skills such as critical enquiry
and evaluation of knowledge. We also believe that linkage of research and teaching in academic
work makes university education distinctive (it was beneficial for the two departments the
authors are affiliated with). Moreover, it certainly helped generating additional research
output/knowledge creation and strengthened pathways to postgraduate research (we are currently
working on two IEEE Transactions journal papers as a result of such creation). Finally, we
believe our deeply-embedded security research and teaching integration helps develop student as
knowledge worker, and engages them in concept of the provisionality of existing knowledge.
Deeply-embedded systems methodology, hard skill, and soft skill teaching goals were evaluated
for graduate students working in the related research area (through the assessment of the research
papers they were involved in and theory/simulation/implementation-based question asked). We
also note that a comprehensive assessment later was done by the peer-review methodology of the
authors’ peers. Feedback was collected in the form of oral questions and discussions. The
students were satisfied with the integration outcome and also their publications progress
(typically both academia and industry value top-tier journal publications). The students also
improved their understanding of the general areas of (a) cryptography, (b) security, (c) resourceconstrained digital design, and (d) fault detection and tolerance in cryptography.
We note that the evaluation of success of integration of research and teaching has been
performed by a group of research/teaching faculty members from diverse departments
(electrical/computer engineering, security, and computer science). Data management has been a
pivotal part of this integration, noting that the results are useful for advancing global education
and with the aim of possible improvement from both research and education communities. Such
results are possible through a closely-monitored data management plan for quality assurance of
data which could be possibly modified by engineering industry and academia. The eventual
outcome of this integration is a step-forward to fill the current gap of research in and education
of emerging security mechanisms.

Let us discuss and present the lessons learnt from two the variants of the presented integration.
First, in the teacher-focused variant of integration of emerging cryptographic engineering
research and teaching, security research outcome was transmitted (see Fig. 4). This could include
the results of, for instance, fault diagnosis and tolerance approaches in cryptography (AES or
ECC) transmitted to the learners including but not limited to simulation results and
implementation overhead. Then, the process through which such results are obtained was
transmitted to the students, e.g., how to inject faults through C++ error simulations and/or LFSRs
in hardware description languages, or how to implement and derive area/delay/power
consumption overheads.

Deeply-embedded systems
security’s teacher-focused vs.
student-focused integration of
teaching and research
- Security research outcome transmitted
(Information integrated into teaching)
- Security research process transmitted
(Presentation of methods and approaches)

- Students engage with outcomes (Class
activity comes out of security)
- Students as deeply-embedded security
researchers

Figure 4. Comparison of the integration variants.
Second, in the student-focused variant of integration of emerging cryptographic engineering
research and teaching, engagement is a must. Thus, students have been engaged in the outcomes
and learnt to scrutinize the results and refine them through activities including discussions and
re-simulation/re-implementation of the fault detection methods on ASIC and FPGA hardware
platforms. Then, new problems were identified and students were engaged in performing the
research process from literature review to final polishing for publications.

Conclusions
Computing platforms are expected to be deeply-embedded within physical objects and people
(objects and human body are among two instances of sensitive environments), creating an
Internet of Things (nano-Things). These sensitive embedded computing platforms will enable a
wide spectrum of applications, including implantable medical devices, physical infrastructure
monitoring, and intelligent transportation systems. Unfortunately, the explosion in devices and
connectivity creates a much larger attack surface (opportunity for attackers to succeed.
In this paper, we have presented research and education integration of deeply-embedded systems
security through emerging cryptography mechanisms. Moreover, we have presented the results
of more than one year implementation of the presented strategy at graduate-level through “sidechannel analysis attacks” case studies. The results of the presented work show the success of the
presented work while pinpointing the challenges encountered compared to traditional embedded
system security research/teaching integration.

Finally, we present the outcome of our work as follows:
(a) We were successful in exposing the challenges of deeply-embedded system security
education through working closely with a number of students in the areas of
cryptographic engineering and general reliability;
(b) Teaching and research integration was quite successful with respect to educational goals,
assessments, and research outcome;
(c) We tested and evaluated the possibility of hardware and software secure system codesign teaching and research integration;
(d) Using the experience gained, lessons learnt for developing a respective multi-disciplinary
laboratory for both research and teaching of hardware/software security (this is partly
done and will be a future-work as step-forward for hands-on experiments); and
(e) Inter- and intra-university research collaborations were initiated and will be pursued to
ensure delivering an expanded set of outcomes for the integration.
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